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Post-Conviction Relief for Federal Prisoners
A Survey and a Suggestion
Under 28 U. S. C. § 2255:
By
GE_4m F. Urm N*
In answer to the complaints of numerous federal judges that
they were being engulfed by a flood of habeas corpus petitions,'
Congress in 1948 enacted a complete revision of the habeas corpus
provisions of the Judicial Code. Part of this revision was title 28,
section 2255, of the United States Code which "restates, clarifies
and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ
of error coram nobis."2 Adopted upon the recommendation of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, its declared purpose
was to provide "an expeditious remedy for correcting erroneous
sentences without resort to habeas corpus."3 The ensuing eighteen
years have seen no diminution in the concern of federal judges
with the burden habeas corpus, and now, section 2255 petitions
impose upon them.4 The purpose of this article will be to suggest
that this burden is largely self-imposed, and could be substantially
reduced by a procedure whereby assistance of counsel is available
in the preparation and drafting of petitions for post-conviction
relief. In reviewing the procedural and tactical ramifications of
section 2255, reference will frequently be made to a recent sur-
vey of petitions for relief under this section in the District of
Columbia.5 Two justifications are offered for reliance upon the
*Assistant U.S. Attorney, Central District of California. B.A., Loyola
University of Los Angeles; LL.B., LL.M., Georgetown University. Member
of District of Columbia and California Bars. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Depart-
ment of Justice.
I See, e.g., Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7
F.R.D. 313 (1948); Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D.
171 (1949).2 Reviser s Note, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (1959).
3 Ibid.
4 See, e.g., Symposium, Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Review 33
F.R.D. 363 (1963); Oliver, Post Conviction Applications Viewed by a Federaljudge, 39 F.R.D. 281 (1966).
5 Under the direction of Miss Sylvia Bacon, then Assistant U.S. Attorn-
ey for the District of Columbia, all 1962 criminal cases in the District were
surveyed, to compile statistics as to post-conviction relief subsequently
sought. With her gracious permission, some preliminary findings will be
incorporated herein. This unpublished report will hereinafter be cited
D.C. Survey.
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statistics of one judicial circuit: (1) no similar survey has been
undertaken elsewhere, and (2) because of its general criminal
jurisdiction, the D.C. Circuit surpasses all others in the number
of section 2255 petitions filed.6
I. HABEAs CoDPus AND SEcroN 2255
Although the terms of section 2255 render an application under
its provisions a prerequisite to application for a writ of habeas
corpus unless the remedy under section 2255 is "inadequate or
ineffective, in actual practice section 2255 is the exclusive
remedy available to federal prisoners, since the circumstances in
which section 2255 would be held "inadequate or ineffective" are
extremely rare.8 This "replacement" of habeas corpus was at-
tacked soon after its enactment as a violation of the constitutional
mandate that "the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or invasion the public Safety may
require it."9 In United States v. Hayman,"° the Supreme Court
dealt with this contention. After tracing the legislative history of
section 2255, the Court concluded that:
the sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties encount-
ered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same
rights in another and more convenient forum."
6 Out of 1,093 cases docketed in the District of Columbia District Court
in 1962, motions to vacate under § 2255 were filed in 35. In five cases,
two motions were filed, thus making a total of 40 motions, of which four
were granted. D.C. Survey, Informal reports indicate the following break-
down of § 2255 motions for thirteen other districts, for the same year:
N.D. Cal. 11 S.D. Ill. 7 W.D. Mich. 1
N.D. Ga. 7 S.D. Ind. 5 N.D. Ohio 4
N.D. Ill. 18 D. Kan. 17 S.D. Ohio 0
E.D. M11. 4 E.D. Mich. _ _ 3 M.D. Pa. 0
W.D. Wash. 0
Smith, Title 28, Section 2255 of the United States Code-Motion to Vacate,
Set Aside or Correct Sentence: Effective or Ineffective Aid to a Federal Pri-
soner?, 40 NoTRE DA.um LAw. 171, 183 n. 52 (1965).
728 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
8 Since § 2255 was enacted only three reported decisions have allowed
habeas corpus petitions on behalf of federal prisoners. Mugavero v. Swope,
86 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Stidham v. Swope, 82 F. Supp. 931
(N.D. Cal. 1949); St. Clair v. Hiatt, 83 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1949).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
10 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
11 Id. at 219.
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Under the writ of habeas corpus, application had to be made to
a judge within the district in which the prisoner was being held. 2
This led to a grossly disproportionate number of petitions to the
judges in districts in which federal prisons were located.'3 To
correct this imbalance, it was required that petitions under section
2255 be directed to "the court which imposed the sentence."'4
Thus, the essential difference between the writ of habeas corpus
and section 2255 is in the forum authorized to grant relief.
II. PRocEDURE UNDER SECrLON 2255
Relief under section 2255 is available only to prisoners "in cus-
tody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress."'5
The requirement that the prisoner be "in custody" has been held
to exclude those who have not yet begun to serve the sentence
which they are attacking,' 6 as well as those who have already
served their term but are seeking to invalidate it to prevent its
use as a prior conviction under recidivist statutes." This construc-
tion is consistent with the requirement that habeas corpus petition-
ers be entitled to immediate release.' " The limitation to sentences
of a court established by Act of Congress excludes all state pri-
soners, as well as those under the jurisdiction of courts-martial,'9
the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions,2" and the
District of Columbia Juvenile Court.2'
Upon receipt of the petition, three courses are open to the Dis-
trict Court: (1) it can immediately deny the petition; (2) it can
decide the petition on the merits from files and records on the
case; or (3) it can order a hearing to decide the case. 2
I2 Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
13 For the six years preceeding enactment of § 2255, 63% of federal ha-
beas corpus petitions were directed to five districts: N.D. Cal. (Alcatraz);
N.D. Ga. (Atlanta); Kansas (Leavenworth); W.D. Wash. (McNeil); W.D.
Mo. (Springfield Medical Center). United States v Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
214 n.18 (1952).
'428 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
15 ibid.
16 Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 418 (1959).
17 Relief is still made available to those in this position by a writ of
error coram nobis. Morgan v. United States 346 U.S. 502 (1954). But cf.
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
'"Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131
(1934).9 Massey v. Humphrey 85 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Pa. 1949).2 0 gols v. District of Columbia, 103 A.2d 879 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954).
21 Burke v. United States, 103 A.2d 347 (D.C. Mun. App. 1954).
22 See generally Note, Processing a Motion Attacking Sentence Under
Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. Rlv. 788 (1963).
1967]
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Authority for the denial of a section 2255 petition without a
hearing is found in the statute itself, which states:
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no re-
lief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing there-
on ....23
Thus, if the petition itself does not state facts upon which relief
could be granted, the court can summarily reject the petition. In
Mitchell v. United States, 24 the reasons for such rejections were
succinctly stated by Judge Prettyman for the court:
This conclusion rests upon a simple elementary basis.
If such a movant proved all the facts he alleges, he would
get no relief; the conclusion flows as readily from the
face of the allegations as from their proof .... Under such
circumstances a hearing would be useless, an inexcusable
waste of time, energy and money, because even if the
movant proved what he alleged, he would not be entitled
to relief.2"
Even if the petition does allege facts upon which relief could be
granted, the court can look to the records of the case, which may
show that the allegations of fact are unfounded. The ready
availability of trial records to refute spurious claims was indeed
one of the reasons for requiring section 2255 petitioners to apply
to the court which sentenced them.
26
If the petition presents issues of fact which require the court
to look beyond the record, however, it must order a hearing. Thus,
where a prisoner alleged that his guilty plea was induced by
promises of a United States Attorney, the Supreme Court recently
reversed a District Court's denial of a hearing, stating:
The factual allegations contained in the petitioner's
motion and affidavit, and put in issue by the affidavit
filed with the Government's response, related primarily to
2328 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
24259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958).
25 Id. at 794.
26 Parker, supra note 1, at 175.
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purported occurrences outside the courtroom and upon
which the record could, therefore, cast no real light. Nor
were the circumstances alleged of a kind that the District
Judge could completely resolve by drawing upon his own
personal knowledge or recollection.27
If the court does determine that a hearing is necessary, it can
hold it without requiring the presence of the prisoner.28 This fre-
quently criticized29 provision narrows the traditional habeas cor-
pus requirement that "the person to whom the writ is directed
shall be required to produce at the hearing the body of the person
detained,"" and the Supreme Court, although consistently re-
cognizing the discretion of the trial judge not to require the
petitioner's production, has imposed an affirmative duty to order
the presence of the prisoner in some circumstances.
Whether the prisoner should be produced depends upon
the issues raised by the particular case. Where, as here,
there are substantial issues of fact as to events in which the
prisoner participated, the trial court should require his pro-
duction for a hearing.'
Despite these warnings, the District of Columbia survey revealed
that most petitions were disposed of without a hearing. 2 Since
denial without a hearing seldom brings the prisoner's legal offen-
sive to an end," it may be well to keep in mind the conclusion
of Senior Circuit Judge Walter L. Pope of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals:
[IInsisting upon a finding of the facts in every appro-
priate case is the way most likely to bring frivolous ap-
plications to a sudden end.'4
27 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1962).
2828 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
29 See, e.g., Note, 59 YALE. J. 1183, 1187 n.19 (1950).
2028 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958).
31 United States v. Hayman 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952).32 Out of the 40 motions filed, hearings were granted in only 11 cases.
D.C. Survey.
3 Out of the 36 motions denied, appeals were taken in seven cases.
D.C. Survey.
34 Pope, Suggestions for Lessening the Burden of Frivolous Applications,
33 F.R.D. 409, 419 (1963).
1967]
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Once a finding of facts is made, whether with or without a
hearing, the motion is either granted or denied. The grant of a
motion does not necessarily mean the release of the prisoner. Al-
though being entitled to release is a jurisdictional requirement,
section 2255 expressly authorizes resentencing,35 a new trial, or
merely correction of the sentence.3" The statute also allows ap-
peals to be taken from the order entered on the motion "as from
a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus."3"
Thus the Criminal Appeals Act38 has no application, and the
Government can appeal from the grant of the motion. 9
IL. Gnou~s BEcoGNI : A SuBsrrtrE FOR APPEAL?
A motion for relief under section 2255 "may be made at any
time."'0 As a result, the criticism most frequently leveled at the
increasing resort to this device is its unsettling effect upon the
stability of judicial determinations.
To permit a convicted person to wait months, or even
years as is frequently the case, after the actors have gone
and recollections cannot be refreshed, and then to secure
review consideration of alleged errors open upon the nor-
mal process of appeal, is to damage, if not destroy, an es-
sential element in the rule of law, the element of accurate
impartiality.'1
For this reason, it has frequently been stated that a motion under
section 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for appeal.43 Never-
theless, the four grounds available for relief, as set forth in section
2255, are grounds which could have been raised on appeal: (1) the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose
such sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum
35 Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
3628 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958). See Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S.
334 (1963).
37 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
3818 U.S.C. § 3731 (1958).39 Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963).
4028 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
41 Mitchell v. United States, 259 F.2d 787, 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 850 (1958).
42ibid. Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964); Des-
mond v. United States, 333 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1964); Carrillo v. United
States, 332 F.2d 202 (10th Cir. 1964).
[Vol. 69
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authorized by law; (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to colla-
teral attack. While this excludes errors in the course of the trial
which are not of constitutional dimension, "3 the continuing expan-
sion of the requirements of due process is constantly increasing the
arsenal of constitutional grounds available for collateral attack.44
Perhaps the reason these errors are not raised on appeal lies in
defects in the availability of appeals to indigents." Increased ac-
cessability of appellate review would certainly alleviate some of
the burden of section 2255 motions, since issues raised and decided
on appeal could not be raised again in subsequent collateral pro-
ceedings,"6 but this approach to the problem may merely shift
the burden, rather than dissipate it.
Although a section 2255 motion is not a substitute for appeal,
its use to make an appeal available after expiration of the statutory
time for filing a notice of appeal was suggested in the recent case
of Dillane v. United States." In affirming the denial of a petition
for leave to appeal in forma pauperis because untimely, the court
noted that the failure of appointed counsel to advise the defendant
of his right to appeal48 would be cognizable under section 2255
as ineffective assistance of counsel:
If the court should find the facts to be as alleged, it
should, by the expedient of vacating and resentencing,
restore appellant to the status of one on whom sentence
43 Moss v. United States, 263 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1959); Mitchell v.
United States, 259 F.2d 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958);
Stephenson v. United States, 257 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1958). It is interesting
to note, however, that such errors are among the grounds most frequently
raised in motions to vacate under § 2255. Smith, supra note 6, at 183 n.52.
44 The Supreme Court has effectively foreclosed collateral attacks based
upon many of its most significant recent cases, however, by holding these
cases have no retroactive application to prior trials. In so holding, the
specter of collateral hearings on cases long since tried was a factor given
great weight. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966); Tehann
v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 418-19 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
637-38 (1965). Compare Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A
Comment, 112 U. PA. L. Rnv. 378 (1964).
45See Note, 51 CAIn. L. REv. 970, 974-76 (1963). In only nine of
the thirty-five cases in which § 2255 relief was sought in 1962 District
of Columbia criminal cases had there been prior recourse to appellate courts.
D.C. Survey.
4 ebhart v. Hunter, 184 F.2d 644 (10th Cir. 1950); Owens v. United
States, 174 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1949).
47350 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
48 Undethe recently amended Rule 32 (a (2), Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, all defendants must be advised of their right to appeal
by the sentencing judge. Thus, it is unlikely the Dillane situation will recur.
1967]
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has just been imposed and who has 10 days in which to
institute a direct appeal.49
IV. SuCC-SSIVE MOTIONS
Recognizing the judicial complaint that many prisoners made
a hobby of preparing and sending a habeas corpus petition every
time the Supreme Court handed down a new decision," section
2255 included a provision that "The sentencing court shall not
be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar
relief on behalf of the same prisoner."' Immediately after its
enactment, this provision was criticized as narrowing the availability
of habeas corpus.52 That this is not the case was made clear by
the Supreme Court in Sanders v. United States. There, the peti-
tioner had filed two motions under section 2255. The first, merely
stating conclusions, was summarily denied. The second presented
the same claims, but with sufficient factual allegations. It was
also denied, relying upon the "similar relief" clause of section
2255. The Supreme Court reversed, interpreting the "similar
relief' clause to be the equivalent of section 2244 of the Judicial
Code,54 which limits the discretion of the judge to dismiss sub-
sequent habeas corpus petitions to situations where no new
grounds are presented. The Court then circumscribed the domain
of res judicata in collateral proceedings by broadly defining what
grounds are "new":
Controlling weight may be given to denial of a prior ap-
plication for federal habeas corpus or § 2255 relief only if
(1) the same ground presented in the subsequent applica-
tion was determined adversely to the applicant on the
49 350 F.2d at 733.
50 Concern with successive petitions may be exaggerated. Of the forty
motions filed under § 2255 in 1962 D.C. cases, only 5 were filed by prisoners
who had made prior motions. D.C. Survey.
51 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
52 See Note, 59 YAXE L. J. 1183, 1188 n.24 (1950).
53373 U.S. 1 (1963), 62 MiCH. L. REv. 903 (1964).
5428 U.S.C. § 2244 (1958):
No circuit or district judge shall be required to entertain an application
for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the detention of a person
pursuant to a judgment of a court of the United States, or of any
State, if it appears that the legality of such detention has been deter-
mined by a judge or court of the United States on a prior application
for a writ of habeas corpus and the petition presents no new ground not
theretofore presented and determined, and the judge or court is satis-
fied that the ends of justice will not be served by such inquiry.
[Vol. 69
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prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the
merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served
by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.55
In limiting the circumstances under which successive ap-
plications can be denied, however, the Court went beyond the
denial of prior applications, to the other ground most frequently
asserted by the courts in dismissing successive applications: abuse
of remedy. Although it was generally recognized that abuse of
remedy would be grounds for outright denial of a section 2255
petition, the lower courts were divided as to how abuse of remedy
was to be established. Illustrative of this disagreement was the
1959 decision of Smith v. United States.56 After denial of a
section 2255 motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, Smith
filed a second motion alleging mental incompetency to stand
trial, which the District Court Judge refused to consider. Sitting
en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia was unable to muster a majority on the question of how
abuse should be established. Judge Fahy, joined by Judges Edger-
ton, Bazelon and Washington, maintained that abuse was a
defensive plea.57 He cited weighty authority, for in a habeas
corpus case the Supreme Court had held:
[I]f the Government chooses not to deny the allegation
or to question its sufficiency and desires instead to claim
that the prisoner has abused the writ of habeas corpus, it
rests with the Government to make that claim with clarity
and particularity in its return to the order to show cause.58
Judge Danaher, joined by Judge Burger, placed the burden of
justifying his failure to raise the second ground in the first motion
upon the prisoner, but said that Smith's justification was readily
apparent from the mental status alleged in his second motion.59
Judges Miller 6 and Bastian, 6 in separate dissents, found no
justification, saying the burden was on the petitioner and had not
been met.
55373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
56270 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (en banc).
5 7 Id. at 926-27.58 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948).
59 270 F.2d at 928.60 Id. at 935.
61 Id. at 936-38.
1967]
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The controversy was laid to rest by the Sanders Court with the
simple statement that "full consideration of the merits of the new
application can be avoided only if there has been an abuse of the
writ or motion remedy; and this the Government has the burden
of pleading."62
V. R=u 35: CONFLUENCE OR CoNFor'?
The post-conviction relief most frequently sought in federal
courts63 is a reduction or correction of sentence pursuant to Rule 35
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.64 Thus, any discussion
of the "burdens" of post-conviction proceedings under Section 2255
must take cognizance of the far more burdensome Rule 35 pro-
ceedings.
While most Rule 35 petitions are simply emotion-laden pleas for
a reduction of sentence, the provision for correction of an "illegal"
sentence at any time raises issues quite similar to Section 2255
proceedings. The purpose of this provision of Rule 35, and the
ways in which it differs from Section 2255, were set forth at some
length in Duggins v. United States65 by Judge Shackleford Miller,
Jr., of the Sixth Circuit:
This rule became effective March 21, 1946, more than two
years prior to the enactment of Sec. 2255, Title 28, U.S.
Code on June 25, 1948. It was a codification of existing
law and was intended to remove any doubt, created by the
ruling in United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67, about
62 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963).63 In 1962 D.C. cases, 329 such motions were filed. The great bulk of
these were in the form of a letter to the sentencing judge. Although only
nineteen of these motions were granted, appeals were taken from denials
in only two cases. Many of the motions were successive: 57 prisoners ac-
counted for a total of 156 petitions, some filing as many as six or seven.
D.C. Survey.64 FED. R. CrM. P. 35:
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may correct
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided
herein for the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a sentence
within 120 days after the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days
after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon affirmance of thejudgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after entry
of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of,
or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. The
court may also reduce a sentence upon revocation of probation as
provided by law. (As amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966).
65240 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1957).
[Vol. 69
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the jurisdiction of the District Court to correct an illegal
sentence after the expiration of the term at which it was
entered.... Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure certain problems were involved in the ending
of a term of court and the start of another. It was the
purpose of Rules 45 (c), 33, 34, 35 and 36 to meet these
problems. It was not their purpose to meet the problems
involved in habeas corpus proceedings or a collateral
attack upon a judgment. Rule 35 presupposes a convic-
tion and affords a procedure for bringing an improper
sentence under it into conformity with the law .... Sec.
2255, Title 28, U.S. Code, on the other hand, covers
the broader field of collateral attack upon the validity
of a judgment of conviction by reason of matters dehors
the record. ... Being a procedural substitute for a habeas
corpus proceeding, the right to relief under § 2255 is
limited by the express terms of the statute to situations
where the prisoner is attacking the judgment under
which he is in custody and, if successful, would be en-
titled to be released. Such limitations do not apply for
a proceeding under Rule 35, Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.66
Although they differ in purpose, there is at least one area of
confluence between Rule 35 and Section 2255. Among the grounds
available for collateral attack under Section 2255 is the excess of
sentence over the maximum authorized by law. This would clearly
render a sentence "illegal" within the meaning of Rule 35.6" Thus,
where consecutive or concurrent sentences for multiple counts of an
indictment are attacked on the ground that the counts arose from
the same transaction, it might be appropriate to seek relief under
either Rule 35 or Section 2255.68 Where relief is only available
under Rule 35 because the prisoner is not entitled to immediate
release, the courts have shown no reluctance to construe a motion
labeled as one under Section 2255 as a Rule 35 motion.69 Con-
66 Id. at 483-84.
674 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2301 (Rules Ed.
1951); 8 MooRE, FEDER. PRACTICE-CIPES, C(mnNAL RULEs § 35.04 (1966).68Wilson v. United States, 310 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1962); Smith v.
United States, 287 F.2d 270 (9th Cr.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 946(1961).69 Hefrin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Bayless v. United
States, 288 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 971 (1961); Duggins
v. United States, 240 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1957).
1967]
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versely, the courts are also quite willing to treat a Rule 35 motion
as one under Section 2255 where necessary."0 Therefore, for the
most part it would appear to make little difference what label
is attached to the motion. However, One significant distinction
should be noted. The government has no right to appeal from the
grant of a Rule 35 motion;7" it can appeal from the grant of a
Section 2255 motion. 2
Thus far, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to expand the
meaning of "illegal sentence" in Rule 35 beyond the narrow con-
fines established in the 5-4 decision of Hill v. United States:
But, as the Rule's language and history make clear, the
narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any
time of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors
occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the im-
position of sentence. The sentence in this case was not
illegal. The punishment meted out was not in excess of
that prescribed by the relevant statutes, multiple terms
were not imposed for the same offense, nor were the
terms of the sentence itself legally or constitutionally
invalid in any other respect."3
The specific error of which the Supreme Court refused to take cog-
nizance in Hill, the denial of the right to allocution at the time
of sentence, can now be reached under Rule 35 by virtue of the
1966 amendment allowing the court to correct "a sentence im-
posed in an illegal manner." 4 In any case, unless the error is such
that it cannot be raised by collateral attack, the Hill limitation of
Rule 35 is without consequence in light of alternative remedies."'
70Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963); Moss v. United
States, 263 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1959); United States v. Bader, 185 F. Supp.
224 (1960), aff'd, 288 F.2d 452 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 851
(1961). But see Johnson v. United States, 334 F.2d 880, 883 (6th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
71 Andrews v. United States, supra note 70.
7 21Ibid. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 209 n.4 (1952).
73 368 U.S. 424,430, reh. den. 369 U.S. 808 (1962).
7 4 FED. B. CGnm. P. 35 (as amended Feb. 28, 1966, eff. July 1, 1966).
See Advisory Committee's Note.
7' Even if the prisoner is not entitled to immediate release, collateral
attack is available by writ of error coram nobis. United States v. Morgan,
346 U.S. 502 (1954). But see Johnson v. United States, 334 F.2d 880, 883(6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935 (1965).
[Vol. 69
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VI. Tmr RiGir To CouNsE: A SuGGSTED APPROACH
It is generally held that the appointment of counsel in a Section
2255 proceeding rests in the proper exercise of the court's discre-
tion."6 Since a petition for collateral relief is considered a separate
civil action, the sixth amendment guaranty of assistance of counsel
is not applicable.
The need for counsel is most acute during a hearing, and it
appears most courts appoint counsel to assist a prisoner during the
course of a hearing,"7 and one court, in a much publicized decision,
granted an appointed attorney compensation for his services in
representing an indigent in Section 2255 proceedings.7 8 Mere
presence of counsel at the hearing, however, does little to assist
the court in meeting the burden of petitions for post-conviction
relief. Only by offering the assistance of counsel in the preparation
of petitions will their proliferation be reduced.79 The problem faced
by the judge is not in the conduct of the hearing itself, but in
making an informed determination as to whether a hearing is
necessary. As suggested by the Committee on Habeas Corpus of
the Judicial Conference of the United States:
Congress now has before it bills to provide proper legal
assistance for indigent defendants charged with Federal
offenses and we strongly recommend passage of such
legislation. We think it would promote orderly procedure
if the legislation also provided appropriate legal assistance
for inmates of Federal penal institutions in the preparation
7 6 Ellis v. United States, 313 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1963); Dillon v.
United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.), cert. den. 372 U.S. 909 (1962);
United States v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960); Anderson v. Heinze,
258 F.2d 479 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 889 (1958). See Note,
Right to Counsel in Federal Collateral Attack Proceedings: Section 2255, 30
U. Cm. L. B-v. 583 (1963).
77 Cases cited supra note 76; Desmond v. United States, 333 F.2d 378
(1st Cir. 1964); Pike v. United States, 330 F.2d 53, (5th Cir. 1964);
Milani v. United States, 319 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1963); Campbell v. United
States, 318 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1964). But see Tubbs v. United States, 249
F.2d 37 (10th Ci.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935 (1957).7 8 Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964); 53 GEo.
L. J. 498 (1965).
79 Such a procedure has been suggested to reduce the number of federal
habeas corpus petitions from state prisoners. Meador, Accomodating State
Criminal Procedure and Federal Postconviction Review, 50 A.B.A.J. 928,
931 (1964); Oliver, Postconviction Applications Viewed by a Federal Judge,
39 F.R.D. 281, 290 (1966).
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of their § 2255 petitions. The effect of this would not be
to increase the number of such proceedings, but to enable
judges to determine more readily which petitions merit
hearings and which do not. Under the present practice,
frequently the judge feels constrained to order a hearing,
fearing that there is no other way to ascertain the nature
and merits of the case."
This approach is now being attempted in the Southern District
of California, where, although an attorney is not appointed until
the judge determines a hearing is necessary, he is encouraged to
make full use of discovery devices to disclose all possible grounds
for collateral attack." In this way:
The fullest review of the conviction possible is provided in
the hope that the court will not again be required to enter-
tain new section 2255 petitions from the same prisoner
or that such petitions might be disposed of without re-
quiring a hearing, presence of petitioner, or appointment
of counsel.2
Another approach is that adopted in the Northern District of
Illinois, where it is required that petitions be submitted on forms
supplied by the court, and designed to elicit all the information
necessary for the court to make a determination of the necessity
for a hearing.83 The form is quite complicated, however;' it is
difficult to concieve of how even the most skilled "jail-house law-
yer" could properly complete it without the assistance of counsel,
and such assistance at this stage has been denied."
"oReport of the Committee on Hebeas Corpus, Judicial Conference of
the United States, 33 F.R.D. 367, 385 (1963). For a similar suggestion, see
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1963). The subsequently enacted
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, makes no provision for
appointment or compensation of attorneys representing indigents on colla-
teral proceedings.
81 See Carter, Pre-Trial Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases Under Title
28, United States Code, 32 F.R.D. 391 (1963).
82 Note, Right to Counsel in Criminal Post-Conviction Proceedings, 51
CALiF. L. Rsv. 970, 983 (1963).
83 See Report, supra note 80, at 382.
8 4 The form used for § 2255 motions is reproduced at 33 F.R.D. 404.
85 Thomas v. United States, 308 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1962).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The problem of numerous petitions for post-conviction relief will
probably be with us as long as jail houses are. As picturesquely
stated by Justice Jackson:
Confinement is neither enjoyable nor profitable. And it
is safe to assume that it neither gives rise to new scruples
nor magnifies old ones which would handicap petitioner's
preparation of one habeas corpus application after another.
... The number of times the Government must retry the
case depends only on the prisoner's ingenuity, industry
and imagination.... The prisoner, of course, has nothing
to lose in any event. Perjury has few terrors for a man
already sentenced to 65 years' imprisonment for a crime
of violence. Even such honor as exists among thieves is
not too precious to be sacrificed for a chance at liberty.
Consequently, his varying allegations can run the gamut
of all those perpetuated in the pages of the United States
Reports.86
The creativity of the jail-house lawyer will not be stymied by
summarily denying his petition, however. This article has sug-
gested that the best approach to take is to appoint counsel and
grant a hearing whenever in doubt, so that a determination can
be made on the merits. Once such a determination is made, the
matter can be disposed of with finality. The burden of which the
judiciary complains may be largely self-imposed, as was suggested
by Senior Circuit Judge Walter L. Pope:
Granted that processing all these applications is a burden;
granted that too many of them are frivolous or fraudulent
-yet finding, somewhere in that mass, the case of the
prisoner whose claim is just is a task that is of the greatest
importance. Is it too much to suggest that the burden is
not too heavy-for, searching for and now and then finding
the occasional just cause is, after all, but a part of our
job.87
86 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 296-97 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing). See also Sloan, The Jail House Lawyer versus Court and Counsel:
Some Ideas for Self-Protection, 1 WAsnHnBuR L. J. 517 (1962).8 7 Pope, supra note 34, at 421.
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